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COMPLIANCE OFFICERS:
MORE JOBS, MORE RESPONSIBILITY,
MORE LIABILITY
SUSAN LORDE MARTIN*
ABSTRACT
In response to a great deal of new rule making by federal agencies in the
last few years, corporate compliance departments are becoming larger and
more involved in businesses in an effort to eliminate regulatory violations
and to reduce fines in the event of an offense. At the same time, chief
compliance officers who head these departments are becoming increasingly
concerned that they will be held liable for the actions of others at their
companies merely because they are in charge of their companies’ compliance
programs. This article looks at examples of laws that give rise to compliance mandates and the costs to companies of failing in compliance, the role
of the chief compliance officer in firms, theories for holding chief compliance officers liable for compliance failures, and federal actions against
chief compliance officers. This article concludes that, of course, chief compliance officers should be responsible for their own affirmative illegal
behavior, but they should not have supervisory liability for the infractions
of others unless they truly are those persons’ supervisors. To settle this liability issue, the Securities and Exchange Commission should issue clear
guidelines using a “control” definition for supervisor that the U.S.
Supreme Court has used in another context.
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INTRODUCTION

In response to a great deal of new rule making by federal agencies
in the last few years, corporate compliance departments are becoming
larger and more involved in line businesses in an effort to eliminate
regulatory violations and to reduce fines in the event of an offense.1 At
the same time, chief compliance officers (“CCO”) who head these
departments are becoming increasingly concerned that they will be
held liable for the actions of others at their companies merely because
they are in charge of their companies’ compliance programs.2
In fact, there is little evidence that federal regulators intend to do
that,3 but there is also no clear affirmative legal decision or rule protecting CCOs from secondary liability. What may be equally discomforting for CCOs is that many of them spend less than fifty percent of
1. Jennifer Smith, New Legal Pitfalls Abound—Cybercrime, Labor Rules, Financial Penalties Add to General Counsels’ Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2014, at B6; Daniel M. Gallagher,
Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the 2013 Nat’l Compliance Outreach Program for Broker-Dealers (Apr. 9, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1365171515226#.UvAMT_shMuc.
2. Former SEC Compliance Chief Asks Chairwoman White to Stop Suing Compliance Officers,
MARKET COUNSEL, marketcounsel.com/2013/06/26/former-sec-compliance-chief-askschairwoman-white-to-stop-suing-compliance-officers/ (citing John H. Walsh, former Acting Director of the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations); Christian
J. Mixter, ALI-ABA Mutual Fund Regulation and Compliance Conference, July 19–20,
2012, SEC, SRO, and Private Litigation Developments Affecting Mutual Funds, 2011–2012 (noting In the Matter of Theodore W. Urban was a case closely watched by compliance professionals); Mark Schoeff Jr., Crucial SEC Vote Leaves Compliance Officers in the Dark, INVESTMENT
NEWS (Jan. 27, 2012, 3:39 PM), www.investmentnews.com/article/20120127/FREE/
120129924 (noting compliance professionals “are nervous about the SEC’s initiative
targeting compliance”).
3. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Liability of Compliance and Legal Personnel at
Broker-Dealers Under Sections 15(b)(4) And 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, SEC DIV. OF TRADING
AND MARKETS (Sept. 30, 2013), www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-cco-supervision093013.htm (noting that “[t]he Exchange Act does not presume that a broker-dealer’s
compliance or legal personnel are supervisors solely by virtue of their compliance or legal
functions”) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
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their time on compliance issues4 in spite of the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) observations of widespread violations
of various legal rules among organizations.5 Moreover, companies are
asking their CCOs to do more with fewer resources.6
This article looks at examples of laws that give rise to compliance
mandates and the costs to companies of failing in compliance, the role
of the CCO in firms, theories for holding CCOs liable for compliance
failures, and federal charges against CCOs. This article concludes that,
of course, CCOs should be responsible for their own affirmative illegal
behavior, but they should not have supervisory liability for the infractions of others unless they truly are those persons’ supervisors. If they
are not in positions of power over others in their companies, then their
punishment for not doing their jobs satisfactorily should be the same as
that of other workers: termination or resignation, not government
prosecution. To settle the liability issue, the SEC should issue clear
guidelines for CCO liability using a “control” definition for supervisor
that the U.S. Supreme Court has used in another context.
II.

THE ROLE

OF THE

CCO

A. Origin of the CCO: Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The CCO for electronics manufacturer Jabil has defined compliance as “developing and implementing processes and procedures . . .
[to address] risks that appear in the business model . . . [and] document[ing] how you are anticipating that risk by programmatic means
that show the company is serious about not getting into trouble . . . .”7
The Vice President of Compliance at Pfizer has asserted that the CCO
has to be aware of risks in all facets of a business including research,
4. Melanie Waddell, Compliance Pros’ Pay, Budgets Getting Chopped, THINKADVISOR
(Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2013/08/29/compliance-pros-pay-budgets-getting-chopped (citing survey by National Regulatory Services); NATIONAL REGULATORY SERVICES, NRS COMPLIANCE COMPENSATION STUDY 2011 5 (2011), available at http://
www.nrs-inc.com/Global/White%20Papers/
NRS%20Compliance%20Compensation%20Study%202011_web.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Speech at the Regulatory Compliance
Ass’n: Doing the Right Thing: Compliance that Works for Investors (Apr. 18, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515784#.UuvncPshM
uc (citing widespread violations of Investment Advisers Act of 1940) [hereinafter
Aguilar].
6. Erica Teichert, SEC Commissioner Criticizes Compliance Liability Framework, LAW360
(Apr. 9, 2013, 7:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/431479/sec-commissioner-criticizes-compliance-liability-framework (citing SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher). In a
2011 survey, twenty-nine percent of responding CCOs said they did not have sufficient
budgets to support their programs; only twenty-seven percent thought their budgets were
adequate. The Risk Intelligent Chief Compliance Officer: Champion of Risk Intelligent Compliance, DELOITTE (2012), http://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/governance-risk-andcompliance/articles/risk-intelligent-chief-compliance-officer.html.
7. Gregory J. Millman, The Business of Risk: Q&A with Odell Guyton of Jabil Inc., WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/16/
the-business-of-risk-qa-with-odell-guyton-of-jabil-inc/ (quoting Odell Guyton, head of
global compliance at Jabil Inc. and former CCO at Microsoft Corp).
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manufacturing, marketing, and the development of business strategies
and innovations.8
Corporate compliance and ethics programs and the position of
CCO were first created in a noticeable way in 1991 in response to the
enactment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”).9
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198410 created the United States Sentencing Commission and authorized it to develop a system of guidelines
to set penalties for federal crimes.11 The principles underlying the
Guidelines for corporations were “to recognize an organization’s relative degree of culpability; and to encourage desirable organizational
behavior”—a “carrot and stick” approach to control corporate crime.12
The Guidelines assign a “Culpability Score” to corporate offenders
to determine appropriate fines for their infractions.13 An offender
starts with five “points” and then points are added or subtracted
depending on various aggravating or mitigating factors.14 If at the time
of the offense the company had “an effective compliance and ethics
program” in place, three points are subtracted from its Culpability
Score.15 Under the Guidelines, having an effective program requires
specific high-level personnel in the organization to be responsible for
the compliance and ethics program.16 Individuals who have “day-to-day
operational responsibility” have to report regularly to high-level personnel “on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program,” and
must be given “adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct
access to the governing authority.”17 In addition, the governing authority must “exercise reasonable oversight” of compliance.18
8. Deloitte Insights Video, The Chief Compliance Officer of the Future: Embracing a Risk
Intelligent View, YOUTUBE (May 16, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj8gRo
36NOc.
9. Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts about Their Future, 71
WASH. U. L. Q. 205, 209 (1993) (Nagel was a member of U.S. Sentencing Commission
and Swenson was Deputy General Counsel of Commission); Hannah Clark, Chief Ethics
Officers: Who Needs Them?, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2006, 12:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
2006/10/23/leadership-ethics-hp-lead-govern-cx_hc_1023ethics.html; History of the ECOA,
ETHICS & COMPLIANCE OFFICER ASSOC., http://www.theecoa.org/imis15/ECOAPublic/
ABOUT/History_of_the_ECOA/ECOAPublic/AboutContent/History.aspx?hkey=43ce05
7e-1870-408c-a6b3-b2f27c5b2950.
10. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98; 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551–3673 (1988).
11. See id. §§ 991, 994.
12. Nagel & Swenson, supra note 9, at 228 (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS
(Aug. 30, 1991)); Patti B. Saris, Remarks at the 12th Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute 4 (Oct. 7, 2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/Organizational_Guidelines/Special_Reports/saris-remarks-annual-compliance-and-ethics-institute
.pdf.
13. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2013).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1).
16. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
17. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C).
18. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A).
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The offending organization can have its Culpability Score reduced
by one to five more points by disclosing the offense, cooperating with
an investigation, and accepting responsibility for its criminal conduct.19
The Culpability Score corresponds to a multiplier for a base fine set in
the Guidelines depending on the nature of the infractions.20 Base fines
range from $5,000 to $72,500,000 for each infraction.21 Multipliers
range from .05 for a Culpability Score of 0 or less, to 4.0 for a Culpability Score of 10 or more.22 Thus, more corporations are becoming
increasingly committed to effective compliance programs so that violations are less likely to occur and fines will be mitigated in the event of a
regulatory infraction.
Unfortunately, it is common for companies to hire a CCO or to
upgrade the CCO role after they have gotten into regulatory trouble
rather than as part of their everyday management arrangements.23
Regulators have asserted that they give more credit to offending companies that have incurred infractions in spite of robust compliance and
ethics programs than to companies that start compliance programs
after they have been investigated and prosecuted.24 In fact, regulators
are less likely to bring an action for isolated instances of misconduct
against a company that has a sincere compliance program and good
internal controls.25 An Associate Director of the SEC has noted two
instances when the SEC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) decided
not to prosecute companies for the illegal actions of employees.26 They
did not prosecute Morgan Stanley after an employee was convicted of
criminal bribery because they were convinced that Morgan Stanley’s
internal controls were sufficient to ensure that other employees were
not also guilty of bribery.27 In 2013, the SEC entered into a non-prosecution agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation (“RLC”) after a subsidiary paid bribes to Argentinian government officials.28 The SEC did
not charge RLC with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”) because the company expeditiously reported the results of its
internal investigation to the SEC, readily produced documents with
summaries and translations, discovered the violations while implementing compliance initiatives at its foreign subsidiary, instituted a new company-wide compliance program, and, after conducting a worldwide risk
assessment investigation, terminated its subsidiary in Argentina.29
19. Id. § 8C2.5(g).
20. Id. § 8C2.4.
21. Id. § 8C2.4(d).
22. Id. § 8C2.6.
23. Stephen L. Cohen, Assoc. Dir. of Enforcement, SEC, Remarks at SCCE’s (Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics) Annual Compliance & Ethics Institute (Oct. 7,
2013).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph
Lauren Corporation Involving FCPA Misconduct (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www
.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514780#.UuLrFso7yQ.
29. Id.
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RLC’s punishment was to pay the relatively low amount of approximately $1.5 million in a combination of illicitly attained profits and
fines.30
On the other hand, at about the same time, the amounts required
of other companies to settle SEC and criminal charges against them was
much larger because they did not have mitigating factors in their
favor.31 The SEC and DOJ investigated Parker Drilling Company for
making illegal payments to resolve customs problems with Nigerian officials in violation of the FCPA.32 Parker had to pay $15.85 million to
settle these charges, and it had to hire a CCO, who would report to the
CEO and the Board’s Audit Committee, and a full-time staff for the
CCO.33 Total S.A., an oil and gas company, had to pay $398 million to
settle SEC and DOJ charges that it violated the FCPA by paying bribes
in Iran for contracts to develop Iranian oil and gas fields.34 Total S.A.
also had to agree to hire an independent compliance consultant.35
The Guidelines and their implementation by the SEC and the DOJ
have made CCOs quasi-government agents for ferreting out illegal company behavior. From that perspective, it is easy to see why CCOs would
not be embraced as C-suite insiders. If, however, CEOs and their
boards are sincere about acting within the law, not outside it or on the
edge, then the CCO will be their first line of defense against violations
and, in the event of infractions, sanctions imposed by federal regulators
and concomitant harms to an organization’s reputation.36
B.

Compliance Mandates for CCOs

A myriad of federal laws require a CCO’s attention to ensure that
the company is behaving legally. They vary for different industries.
What follows are examples of some of the rules that have significantly
increased the roles of compliance departments and CCOs, and that
may present risks of personal liability for CCOs.
1.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“SEA”)37

The SEA regulates the secondary sales of securities and the parties
involved in that business and empowers the SEC to carry out federal
securities laws.38 Section 15(b)(6) of the SEA authorizes the SEC to
sanction individual brokers or dealers and their supervisors for violating Section 15(b)(4)(E) which prohibits violating any federal securities
laws or failing to reasonably supervise others to prevent such viola30. Managing Risk Better in 2013: Is What’s Old, New Again?, INTELLIGIZE 3 (June
2013), http://info.intelligize.com/june2013whitepaper [hereinafter INTELLIGIZE].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 5.
37. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
38. Id.
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tions.39 It is the latter that concerns CCOs. Section 15(b)(4)(E) does
contain a safe harbor provision:
[N]o person shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other person, if—
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for
applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by
such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent upon him [sic] by reason of such procedures and
system without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures
and system were not being complied with.40

The problem is the lack of certainty in knowing if CCOs are supervisors
for SEA purposes when they advise and counsel broker-dealers and the
ambiguity of “reasonable” behavior.
The SEC has said that being on a compliance staff does not make
one a supervisor, nor does merely providing advice on compliance
issues.41 Some indicia of supervisory authority according to the SEC
are company policies or procedures identifying a person as having
supervisory responsibility over others; the power to hire, reward, or
punish others; and the power to prevent the continuation of illegal
behavior.42 Unfortunately, these statements cannot reassure CCOs that
they are not incurring supervisory legal liability for infractions committed by others at their companies when CCOs are acting in their advisory
roles. SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher has said that the issue of
when a CCO is a supervisor “remains disturbingly murky.”43 To do the
job well, a CCO has to be able to influence workers and managers, but
to avoid liability, the CCO cannot operate as their supervisor.44 At a
2012 compliance conference held by the Investment Adviser Association, a partner at a well-known law firm, in an attempt to create a
bright-line test to guide CCOs’ behavior, concluded that a CCO must
be able to influence, but cannot compel.45 That formulation would not
be very helpful for CCOs trying to avoid legal liability even if it were
accurate, but, in fact, it is the opposite of what the SEC declared in
adopting new rules under the Investment Advisers Act (“IAA”) and the
Investment Company Act (“ICA”) in 2003.

39. Id. §§ 78o(b)(6), 78o(b)(4)(E).
40. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
41. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 3.
42. Id.
43. Dan Macy, How to Avoid Being Branded a ‘Supervisor’: Industry Panel Takes Fresh
Look at CCO Liability, THOMPSON INFORMATION SERV. (Apr. 24, 2012), www.thompson
.com/public/newsbrief.jsp?cat=FINANCE&id=3840.
44. Id. (citing SEC Div. of Inv. Mgmt. Deputy Dir. Robert Plaze).
45. Id.
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IAA46 and ICA47

The IAA and the ICA give the SEC similar authority over investment advisors that the SEA gives it over broker-dealers.48 Originally,
the IAA and the ICA did not require investment advisers and investment companies to have written compliance procedures.49 In 2003 the
SEC promulgated new rules under these acts in response to misconduct
and scandal in the mutual fund industry.50 The rules require investment adviser companies and individual investment advisers to adopt
and implement policies and procedures designed to prevent violations
of federal securities laws, to review these policies and procedures and
their implementation at least annually, and to designate a CCO to be
responsible for administering these policies and procedures.51
The SEC stated that to be in compliance with the new rules, the
CCO should be “competent and knowledgeable regarding the federal
securities laws” and “empowered” to create and implement the
required policies and procedures.52 The SEC views the CCO as a “risk
manager, a strategist, . . . an integral part of senior management . . .
[and as an SEC] ally.”53 The SEC noted that the CCO “should have
sufficient seniority and authority to compel others to adhere to the
compliance policies and procedures.”54
The SEC also emphasized the close relationship between the CCO
and an organization’s board of directors, particularly the independent
directors.55 The CCO reports directly to the board, the board must
approve the CCO’s compensation, and only the board can remove the
CCO.56 The SEC noted that this direct relationship with the board
would allow the CCO, as a “key element” in its new rules for investor
protection, to “aggressively pursue non-compliance.”57 In addition, to
protect the CCO from being pressured by employees to conceal noncompliance, the new rules prohibit attempts to coerce or mislead the
CCO in carrying out compliance responsibilities.58
Although discussing the CCO’s power, in 2003 the SEC was not
considering the CCO’s concomitant liability at all. Language like
46. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2012).
47. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2012).
48. Ralph C. Ferrara et al., Hardball! The SEC’s New Arsenal of Enforcement Weapons,
47 BUS. LAW. 33, 83 (1991).
49. Lawrence Cohen, The SEC Is Picking Monitors for the Classroom, 14 BUS. L. TODAY
57, 57 (2004).
50. Aguilar, supra note 5.
51. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisors, 68
Fed. Reg. 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.38a–1, 275.206(4)–7,
275.204–2, 279.1 (2014)) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule].
52. Lori A. Richards, Dir. Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations,
SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: The New Compliance Rule: An Opportunity for Change (June
28, 2004), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch063004lar.htm.
53. Id.
54. SEC Final Rule, supra note 51, at 74,721.
55. Richards, supra note 52.
56. SEC Final Rule, supra note 51, at 74,721.
57. Id. at 74,722.
58. Investment Company Act of 1940, r. 38a-(1), supra note 47.
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“empowered,” “senior management,” and “authority to compel others”
might be assumed to describe a “supervisor.” Therefore, on the one
hand, these descriptions make CCOs nervous because of the additional
liability they may indicate; but, on the other, the rules greatly expand
the need for compliance personnel. In promulgating the new rules,
the SEC estimated that the additional industry burden would be
approximately a million worker hours.59
3.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)60

SOX was probably the biggest impetus for companies to hire and
empower CCOs. Congress enacted SOX in response to another set of
corporate scandals, this time involving the inaccurate reporting of corporate financial transactions.61 The main provisions of SOX that created new compliance work require that in public companies, signing
officers certify they have reviewed financial reports and attest to their
accuracy,62 issuers publish information about their internal controls
and procedures for financial reporting,63 and issuers promptly disclose
material changes to their financial condition.64 Shortly after the passage of SOX, one commentator estimated that corporate compliance
costs would double in response.65 An example of an international company with $3 billion in revenue estimated initial additional costs at $4
million to $9 million with recurring annual costs of $3 million.66 A
survey of internal auditors in 2004 concluded that most companies did
not have the skills and resources to implement SOX mandates, and they
were behind schedule in meeting date requirements.67
A strong incentive for companies to implement SOX mandates was
the tying of officer certification violations to legal sanctions for officers:
a maximum penalty of $1 million, a maximum prison term of ten years,
or both, and willful violators face a maximum fine of $5 million, a maximum of twenty years in prison, or both.68 The pressure to comply with
SOX caused an immediate reaction calling for amending or repealing
59. SEC Final Rule, supra note 51, at 74,716.
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2002)).
61. See, e.g., Allison Fass, One Year Later, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES (July 22,
2003, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html (noting
scandals at Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, Global Crossing, WorldCom). For an overview
of SOX, see Patrick W. Fitzgerald et al., Towards Understanding Sarbanes-Oxley and Business
and Financial Ethics Requirements in a Post-Enron World, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 64,
76–84 (2006); J. Brent Wilkins, Comment, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: The Ripple Effects
of Restoring Shareholder Confidence, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339 (2005).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2012).
63. Id. § 7262.
64. Id. § 78m; see, Deborah J. Friedman & Michelle H. Shepston, The Implications of
Sarbanes-Oxley: Bringing a Different Perspective to the Acquisition Due Diligence Process, 51 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 23–1 (2005) (overview of SOX requirements).
65. Fass, supra note 61.
66. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 61, at 79.
67. Jefferson Wells Int’l & The Inst. of Internal Auditors, Sarbanes-Oxley Implementation Survey 3, 5 (May 2004) (on file with journal).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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it, and asserting its negative effects on businesses and investors.69 Nevertheless, SOX resulted in many companies hiring “an internal cop,”
the start of a CCO being a routine part of corporate management.70
Before SOX, business emphasis in response to scandals had been
on ethics,71 and managers in this area were generally human resources
workers with little internal or external visibility.72 After SOX, forced by
the SEC to hire compliance officers in response to violations, companies were more likely to hire high-profile people with more power and
access to CEOs and corporate boards.73 For example, KPMG, the
accounting firm, hired a former SEC Chair; Computer Associates, the
software company, hired a former vice-president at United Technologies; and Morgan Stanley hired a former attorney in the New York
Attorney General’s office.74 While there was talk about the unprecedented power of these people in their new roles,75 it was not accompanied by concern for the liability they were undertaking. It was a
measure of the seriousness of companies to be compliant and ethical to
note that their CCOs had the power to take corrective actions including
the ability to fire employees.76
4.

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)

In their required disclosures in SEC filings, companies made more
than 2,000 references to the FCPA in a six-month period between 2012
and 2013.77 In 2012, the SEC took 734 enforcement actions based on
FCPA violations, a twenty-eight percent increase over 2006.78 There is
no doubt that assessing and prioritizing bribery risk is a big concern of
CCOs.79
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977 in reaction to yet another
scandal: this one concerning U.S. companies bribing foreign officials.80
Its purpose was to protect honest businesses and the credibility of mar69. See, e.g., Cory L. Braddock, Comment, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors
Would Be Foolish to Pay a Penny or a Pound for the Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, 2006
BYU L. REV. 175, 202 (2006); Ryan Hinson, Note & Comment, Paralyzed Inaction or Conscious Disregard: An Assessment of the SEC’s Efforts to Reduce the Reporting Requirements for Small
Publicly Traded Companies, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1335, 1341–43 (2007); Paul Rose, Balancing
Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 707, 707 (2005).
70. Joseph Weber, The New Ethics Enforcers, BUS. WK., Feb. 12, 2006, at 76, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-02-12/the-new-ethics-enforcers.
71. See, e.g., id. (citing Enron’s 62-page code of ethics “to protect the outfit’s ‘reputation for fairness and honesty’ ”).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. INTELLIGIZE, supra note 30, at 3.
78. Id.
79. Jimmy Lin, 3 Expert Opinions on FCPA Compliance and Compliance Risks, NETWORK
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.tnwinc.com/6066/fcpa-compliance-houston-2/.
80. DOJ & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2
(2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide].
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kets in the eyes of the public.81 It applies to all companies that have to
file reports with the SEC, all businesses that have their principal place
of business in the United States or are organized under U.S. laws, and
anyone involved in bribery while in the United States.82 It prohibits
payments intended to influence foreign officials to assist “in obtaining
or retaining business.”83 In addition to its anti-bribery provisions, the
FCPA also contains accounting provisions for companies that have to
file with the SEC.84 It requires companies to keep accurate, detailed
books and records and to maintain a system of internal accounting controls.85 A purpose of the accounting requirements is to keep companies from mischaracterizing bribes in their books and records.86
The DOJ and SEC have emphasized the importance of an effective
compliance program in preventing and discovering FCPA misconduct.87 They have publicized one case in which a U.S. financial institution was involved in a real estate joint venture with special purpose
vehicles (“SPV”) created by a district government department in
China.88 The U.S. financial institution had a well-staffed and robust
compliance program that included regular training for all employees
and extensive due diligence, but nevertheless, it failed to learn that the
Chinese official responsible for the transaction had a significant personal stake in one of the SPVs.89 Because the financial institution acted
in good faith in implementing its compliance program, the DOJ and
SEC did not take enforcement action against it.90
Heavy penalties under the FCPA are a big incentive to maintain
active compliance programs. Businesses can be fined up to $2 million
for each violation of the anti-bribery provisions.91 Officers and directors can be fined up to $250,000 for each violation and imprisoned for
up to five years.92 Businesses can be fined up to $25 million for violating the accounting provisions, and individuals are subject to fines of up
to $5 million and imprisonment for up to twenty years.93

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
tled with
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2012).
Id.
Id. § 78m(b)(2).
Id.
FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 80, at 39.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. The DOJ prosecuted the institution’s executive who pleaded guilty and setthe SEC. Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd, 78ff (2012).
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3), (e) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 78ff.
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In 2010 Congress enacted Dodd-Frank in response to a national
financial crisis and recession “[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, [and] to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices . . . .”95 Agencies regulating the entire financial industry have spent the last four years drafting more than two hundred new rules to implement the law, and they have about another two
hundred to go.96 The House Financial Services Committee estimated it
would take twenty-four million worker hours annually for businesses to
satisfy Dodd-Frank rules.97
Among the new regulations is the requirement that swap dealers,
major swap participants, and futures commission merchants designate a
CCO who must submit an annual report to the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) assessing the company’s compliance
activities.98 In promulgating rules under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC made
some important decisions in defining the role of CCOs. In deference
to commenters’ concerns about the scope of a CCO’s duties, the CFTC
decided not to require that a CCO have full responsibility and authority
or “ ‘enforce policies and procedures, but rather a CCO need only
“develop . . . policies and procedures . . . to ensure compliance with . . .
regulations.”99 Thus, the final rules list the CCO’s duties as administering policies and procedures to ensure compliance; resolving conflicts of
interest in consultation with the CEO or Board of Directors; establishing procedures for remediating violations; and preparing an annual
report for the CEO or Board.100 By 2012, unlike ten years earlier, the
CCO is no longer described as having power or authority to compel
others. Nevertheless, the CCO has become a more important part of
the management team in many companies, with larger staffs, higher
salaries, and more respect, albeit achieving this success in a more
nuanced way.

94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, and
31 U.S.C.).
95. Id. at Preamble.
96. Abha Bhattarai & Catherine Ho, Four Years Into Dodd-Frank, Local Banks Say This
is the Year They’ll Feel the Most Impact, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/four-years-into-dodd-frank-local-banks-say-thisis-the-year-theyll-feel-the-most-impact/2014/02/07/12c7ca48-877e-11e3-a5bd844629433ba3_story.html.
97. Gallagher, supra note 1.
98. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4d(d), 4s(k) (2010).
99. 17 C.F.R § 3.3(a) (2012).
100. 17 C.F.R § 3.3(d), (e) (2012).
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The CCO’s Job Today

Increased regulation and heavy fines for regulatory violations have
made the role of CCO more important and prestigious, and have
increased demand for experienced people.101 In considering the lagging job market in the United States, commentators have described the
compliance field as “booming.”102 Because more businesses are operating internationally with a concomitant increase in regulations and risks,
even industries that are subject to less domestic regulation, such as
manufacturing and technology, are developing more comprehensive
compliance programs.103 The serious emergence of cybercrime risks
has also added to the portfolio of CCOs.104 A recent study of executives
in nineteen industries indicated that ninety-eight percent of financial
companies have CCOs, eighty-two percent of technology companies,
and eighty percent of manufacturing companies.105 CEOs and others
are more likely now to view CCOs as businesspeople, not merely
naysayers,106 who have to be involved in decisions about risk in order to
make compliance programs work.107
Companies, especially banks, are greatly increasing the size of compliance departments.108 HSBC Holdings PLC, for example, added
1,600 workers to its compliance department in 2013.109 JPMorgan
101. James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A New Mission for the
Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 2 (2013). In a 2013 survey of compliance professionals in more than twenty industries, thirty-eight percent of respondents
said that compliance staffing increased over the past year. SAI GLOBAL & BAKER &
MCKENZIE, 2013 GLOBAL COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS BENCHMARKING SURVEY 5 (2013), available at http://compliance.saiglobal.com/assets/whitepapers/SAI-GLOBAL-whitepaper2013-global-ce-benchmarking-survey.pdf. At America’s Job Exchange in 2010 there were
listings for 221 compliance jobs; in the second half of 2011 there were 9,148 jobs with
“compliance” in the title. Alex Konrad, The One Job Banks and Hedge Funds Can’t Fill, FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2012/03/13/the-one-job-banks-andhedge-funds-cant-fill/.
102. Gregory J. Millman & Samuel Rubenfeld, Compliance Officer: Dream Career?,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2014, 8:13 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424
052702303330204579250722114538750; see also Aruna Viswanatha, Wall Street’s Hot Trade:
Compliance Officers, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2013, 4:35 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/
10/09/us-usa-banks-compliance-idINBRE9980EE20131009 (noting a “red-hot market” for
CCOs); Fanto, supra note 100, at 16–17 (noting perception of compliance job opportunities in difficult job market).
103. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, DEEPER INSIGHT FOR GREATER STRATEGIC VALUE
STATE OF COMPLIANCE: 2013 SURVEY 8 (June 2013), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/riskmanagement/assets/soc-survey-2013-final.pdf.
104. Donna Boehme, 2013’s 10 Big Moments for Chief Compliance Officers, CORP.
COUNSEL (Dec. 20, 2013), http://compliancestrategists.com/csblog/wp-content/
uploads/2014/03/2013s-10-Big-Moments-for-Chief-Compliance-Officers.pdf.
105. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 102, at 8.
106. DELOITTE, supra note 6.
107. Nicholas Elliott, The Morning Risk Report: “There’s Too Much Compliance,” WALL
ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Apr. 5, 2013, 6:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/3013/04/05/the-morning-risk-report-theres-too-much-compliance.
108. Millman & Rubenfeld, supra note 101; Smith, supra note 1, at B6.
109. Millman & Rubenfeld, supra note 101. In 2012, HSBC agreed to pay $1.92
billion to settle money-laundering cases with state and federal regulators. Ben Protess &
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money Laundering,
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Chase announced that in 2013 it was spending an additional $4 billion
on compliance and after adding 7,000 compliance workers in 2013, it
was going to add 3,000 more in 2014.110 Wal-Mart announced that it
spent $282 million on compliance for the year ending January 31,
2014.111 After being investigated by the DOJ and the SEC for allegedly
violating the FCPA by giving envelopes of cash to Mexican officials who
issue permits, Wal-Mart said it hired a dedicated FCPA compliance
director in Mexico.112
There is evidence that more companies are setting up compliance
departments and hiring CCOs, and there is some evidence that these
actions represent more ethical corporate cultures rather than mere window dressing.113 In Asia, where there has not been a corporate culture
that emphasizes ethics and legal compliance, the recent financial crises
have created high demand for compliance personnel, particularly in
global financial companies.114
On the other hand, a Deloitte investigation in 2013 revealed that
about half of the companies surveyed had fewer than five compliance
employees and compliance budgets of less than $1 million.115 A 2012
survey of forty-eight CCOs at Fortune 1000 companies reported that
almost half of the respondents said they did not have sufficient
resources to manage their compliance programs effectively, and more
than half said their companies’ appraisal and incentive programs do
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbcsaid-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering/.
110. Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan’s Chief Compliance Officer Leaves Firm, WALL ST. J.,
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023048347045794051
70312160540 (last updated Feb 25, 2014); Rachel L. Ensign, The Morning Risk Report: Companies Trying Harder to Get Compliance Right, WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Jan. 17,
2014, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/17/the-morningrisk-report-companies-trying-harder-to-get-compliance-right/ [hereinafter Companies Trying Harder]. In 2013 regulatory agencies assessed penalties totaling $20 billion against
JPMorgan Chase. Peter Eavis, Steep Penalties Taken in Stride by JPMorgan Chase, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Jan. 7, 2014, 9:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/steeppenalties-taken-in-stride-by-jpmorgan-chase/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
111. Samuel Rubenfeld, Wal-Mart Forecasts More than $200M in FCPA Costs, WALL ST.
J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Feb. 21, 2014, 10:22 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/21/wal-mart-forecasts-more-than-200-million-in-fcpa-costs/.
112. Id.
113. Samuel Rubenfeld, Employees’ Ethical Behavior Is Best in 20 Years, WALL ST. J.:
RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2014/02/04/employees-ethical-behavior-is-best-in-20-years/ (noting a 2013 survey finding
fewer workers observed corporate misconduct or felt pressure to violate standards and
concluding that a probable cause was commitment to strong ethics and compliance
programs).
114. Michelle Price, Compliance Staff on Top During Asia Bonus Season, FIN. NEWS
(Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2014-02-04/asia-banker-bonusescompliance-regulation?mod=home-mostemailedmod=home-mostemailed&ea9c8a2de0ee
111045601ab04d673622.
115. Gregory J. Millman & Ben DiPietro, More Compliance Chiefs Get Direct Line to
Boss, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2014, 8:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240
52702303330204579250723925965180.
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not support their compliance and integrity objectives.116 This variation
suggests the ambiguity in compliance departments and the role of the
CCO. Recent resignations of CCOs at companies like JPMorgan Chase,
HSBC Holdings PLC, and Barclays have led corporate consultants to
opine on the stress and difficulties CCOs endure because of regulatory
pressure to implement stronger compliance programs while companies
are reluctant to give them sufficient support to do their jobs properly.117 Furthermore, CCOs in global companies have the additional
problem of general acceptance in emerging countries of practices considered illegal in the United States.118
When companies settle with the SEC or the DOJ for regulatory violations they may have to agree to having their CCOs report directly to
their CEOs and boards.119 In a 2013 survey across industries fifty-three
percent of respondents said they reported directly to the board and half
of the remainder said they reported directly to the CEO.120 Nevertheless, some CCOs complain that CEOs do not want to hear advice from
CCOs and compliance programs are not taken seriously.121 Such
problems require CCOs to approach their jobs and their colleagues
emphasizing that a strong compliance program is good for a business’s
bottom line. Among the factors that indicate a successful compliance
program as well as a successful business are the identification of risks
and controls, the optimization of personnel and other resources, the
creation of high quality data and information, and the alignment of
operating strategy with line department activities.122 The result of carrying out these activities effectively can be protection of a company’s
reputation and brand, improvement in personnel performance, lowering of costs associated with compliance failures, and undertaking risk
more confidently.123 Across industries there is evidence that the pri116. CONSERO GROUP LLC, 2012 CHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER DATA SURVEY 7 (Nov.
26, 2012), available at http://consero.com/2012-chief-compliance-officer-data-survey/.
117. Gregory J. Millman, The Morning Risk Report: Mammas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow
Up to Be CCOs, WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Feb. 27, 2014, 6:12 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/27/the-morning-risk-report-mammas-dontlet-your-babies-grow-up-to-be-ccos/.
118. Millman & DiPietro, supra note 114. For example, an Ernst & Young survey in
2012 found that twelve percent of executives in Brazil were willing to use bribery to gain
business. Id.
119. Id. Such was the case in Johnson & Johnson’s settlement with the DOJ in 2013.
Id.
120. Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics (“SCCE”) & Health Care Compliance Association (“HCCA”), The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the Compliance
and Ethics Officer 2–3 (Jan. 2014), https://www.ibe.org.uk/userassets/surveys/
board&ecorelationshipscce.pdf. The numbers are higher for the health care industry
alone. Id.
121. Millman & DiPietro, supra note 114. Some experts complain that CCOs are
mere “window dressing” or “just a mask for the company to hide behind.” Clark, supra
note 9.
122. Robert Biskup, The Benefits of Integrating Governance, Risk and Compliance, WALL
ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 6, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/03/06/the-benefits-of-integrating-governance-risk-and-compliance/.
123. Id.
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mary goal of compliance programs today is protecting a company’s
brand and reputation.124 Responding to pressure from outside regulators is only the third most cited purpose for compliance programs.125
It is integration of compliance with a company’s general goals that will
enhance both and make the CCO more effective and more satisfied.
D.

Part of Legal Department or Separate Compliance Department?

Traditionally, the CCO was part of the Chief Legal Officer’s
(“CLO”)126 office, and sometimes one person held both titles.127 In
the last ten years or so, regulatory agencies have been encouraging the
separation of the two roles.128 This change has set up some skirmishing
between the compliance industry, many of whose members are lawyers,
and law departments, with differences of opinion showing up in discussions by theorists as well.129
A lawyer in charge of a large law firm’s health care practice has
noted the importance of coordinating legal advice with compliance
advice and, therefore, asserted the advantages in having a CCO report
to the CLO as long as the CCO was reporting to directors as well.130 He
opined that a CCO may not have the experience or expertise of a
CLO.131 One theorist has also questioned the sufficiency of expertise
in a stand-alone compliance department and has suggested that C-level
managers may ostracize CCOs who don’t have the influence of
CLOs.132 She has characterized “departmentalization” as possibly just a
“trapping” of a compliance program rather than a change that will actually contribute to a more effective compliance program.133 She characterizes the stand-alone compliance department as a “more commandand-control based approach” rather than the more effective “integritybased or self-regulation approach,”134 but why one would expect that
having a legal department in charge of compliance or requiring a CCO
to report to a CLO would be more likely to lead to the latter is unclear.
An American Bar Association Task Force has also recommended that
124. SAI GLOBAL & BAKER & MCKENZIE, supra note 100, at 7.
125. Id.
126. This article will use the CLO title although in some corporations the person
serving that function is called the General Counsel.
127. Michele DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 73 (2014); Jaclyn Jaeger, The Importance of
Splitting Legal and Compliance, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www
.complianceweek.com/news/news-bulletin/the-importance-of-splitting-legal-and-compli
ance.
128. Jaeger, supra note 127.
129. Jaclyn Jaeger, Why Compliance Reporting to GC Still Exists, COMPLIANCE WK. (Feb.
25, 2014), available at http://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-bulletin/why-compliance-reporting-to-gc-still-exists.
130. Roy Snell, Greg Luce Talks About the Relationship Between Legal Counsel and Compliance, 9 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 31 (2007).
131. Id.
132. DeStefano, supra note 127, at 155.
133. Id. at 157.
134. Id. at 165–67.
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the CLO have primary responsibility for overseeing a corporate compliance program.135
Taking the opposing view, the Office of the Inspector General of
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has favored freestanding compliance departments for hospitals to encourage independence, objectivity, and a system of checks and balances in carrying out
an effective compliance program.136 The Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”) has also urged financial companies to have independent compliance departments that are not
unduly pressured by any other departments.137 One commentator has
suggested that CLOs and their legal departments may not be suited to
creating and implementing a program emphasizing the integrity-based
approach because their training is in avoiding and solving legal
problems.138 They may ignore broad cultural problems in a company
in favor of concentrating on narrow legal solutions.139
Senator Chuck Grassley, when he was chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, led an investigation of Tenet Healthcare Corporation for perpetrating a wide variety of frauds.140 He called Tenet
“among the worst corporate wrongdoers” and specifically mentioned
the woman who was both Tenet’s general counsel and CCO.141 He
noted that as general counsel she “zealously defended Tenet against
claims of ethical and legal non-compliance . . . while as chief compliance officer, she supposedly ensured compliance by Tenet’s officers,
directors and employees.”142 He concluded that “[i]t doesn’t take a pig
farmer from Iowa to smell the stench of conflict in that
arrangement.”143
A 2013 survey of executives from nineteen industries and from
companies with revenue from $200 million to $100 billion indicated
that seventy-nine percent of the U.S. companies surveyed had a CCO
and of those, forty-one percent were based in legal departments.144
The same survey indicated that in the last three years there has been a
gradual reduction in the number of CCOs who report to the CLO in
favor of reporting to CEOs.145
135. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. & AM.
HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 1 (July 1,
2004), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/complianceguidance/Tab%204E%20
Appendx-Final.pdf.
136. Id.
137. SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS’N, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 29
(2013).
138. Linda K. Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and
What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 146 (1999).
139. Id.
140. Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Investigates Tenet Healthcare’s
Use of Federal Tax Dollars (Sept. 7, 2003), available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/
news/news-releases/grassley-investigates-tenet-healthcares-use-federal-tax-dollars.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 103, at 9.
145. Id. at 10, 12.
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The purpose of this article is not to advocate for one or the other
of these organizational models, but merely to provide background for
the consideration of a CCO’s liability as a supervisor. So far, there is
not any clear evidence indicating that one or the other model of a compliance program achieves greater success than the other. Prosecutions
of CCOs also do not suggest that there is more or less protection from
secondary liability for CCOs in charge of their own departments or
CCOs who perform other organizational roles in addition to their compliance roles. However, because there will be overlapping activities
between compliance and legal, it is important that companies establish
protocols to indicate which kind of activity is being undertaken to
ensure that all regulations are being followed and privileges are being
maintained.146
E.

Indicia of an Effective Compliance Program

A recent study of compliance programs suggests that a values-based
approach, rather than a compliance-based approach, gives a company
the most return for its allocation of resources.147 A fifteen-year-old
study came to the same conclusion.148 Generally, compliance-based
programs are viewed as governing behavior required by law, whereas
values-based programs focus on discretionary behavior, are founded on
pre-existing organizational functions, and achieve compliance by
encouraging ethical decision-making.149 One commentator notes that
a values-based approach should be more effective because it encourages
self-governance as employees act according to shared values rather than
in response to the avoidance of punishment.150
In 2012 the DOJ and the SEC issued a joint resource guide to the
FCPA which contains a discussion of the indicia of an effective compliance program,151 and it can be used to evaluate a compliance and ethics program for any purpose. The goal for all businesses should be to
have programs that are specifically tailored to their own needs and risks
so that they can “prevent violations, detect those that do occur, and
remediate them promptly and appropriately.”152 A first step for all
compliance programs is to have senior management clearly articulate,
adhere to, and disseminate company standards so that they set a tone of
146. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 135, at 9.
147. LRN CORP., 2013 ETHICS & COMPLIANCE LEADERSHIP SURVEY REPORT 7 (2013).
148. Treviño et al., supra note 138, at 149.
149. See, e.g., SECRETARIAT, TREASURY BOARD OF CANADA, REPORT ON GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES FOR VALUES AND ETHICS, available at https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rp/sgs01eng.asp (last modified Jan. 17, 2011) (noting that a compliance approach focuses primarily on preventing, detecting, and punishing violations of the law, while a values-based
approach aims to define organizational values and encourage employee commitment to
ethical aspirations); see also Treviño et al., supra note 138, at 135.
150. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV.
106, 111 (1994).
151. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACTS 57-63 (Nov. 14, 2012) available at http://
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
152. Id. at 57.
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compliance and ethics throughout the organization.153 The importance of the “tone at the top” has become a cliché, but it is only effective if it creates the proper “mood in the middle” and “buzz at the
bottom” so that the whole company is invested in the compliance and
ethics standards.154
The standards will generally exist within a company code of conduct and a set of compliance policies and procedures that are clear,
concise, specific to the company’s business and risks, and accessible to
all employees and outside contractors.155 The amount of due diligence, the frequency of internal audits, and the kind and amount of
training for employees depend upon the size of a company and the
particular risks it faces.156 Last but not least, a company has to consider
enforcement and incentives. A company should have clear, fair, and
reliable disciplinary procedures to encourage compliant and ethical
behavior.157
Companies have shown an increased interest in providing incentives for compliant and ethical behavior.158 Incentives could include
having promotions, evaluations, incentive pay, and other rewards
dependent upon employees’ support for and leadership in the company compliance program.159 A large national hospital system, for
example, has implemented a series of metrics to evaluate whether
employees are achieving specific compliance and ethics goals.160 There
are twenty-five to thirty metrics each year.161 Every goal has to be objectively measurable and each is worth a set number of points in the program.162 A department’s good score on the compliance metrics is a
requirement for all executive bonuses.163 Hospital presidents,
although skeptical of the program at first, have become supporters
because they recognize it protects them by indicating that they are taking action to do what the law and ethics require them to do.164

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Saris, supra note 12, at 20.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 151, at 57–58.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Joe Murphy, What Is an Antitrust Compliance Program?, 4 SOCIETY OF CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, available at http://www.compliance-network.com/wp-content/
uploads/2013/02/4th-edition-What-is-an-antitrust-compliance-program.pdf.
160. Gregory J. Millman, Q&A: Daniel Roach, Vice President Compliance and Audit,
Dignity Health, WALL ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/10/24/qa-daniel-roach-vice-president-compliance-and-audit-dignity-health/.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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Support for CCOs: Prohibition Against Misleading CCOs

A recent case supporting CCOs in carrying out their duties was the
first one brought by the SEC under ICA Rule 38a-1(c) that prohibits
securities brokers and dealers from misleading CCOs in performing
their duties.165 Carl Johns managed portfolios for and was an officer of
registered investment companies.166 To hide personal securities transactions, he altered brokerage statements, trade confirmations, and pretrade approvals, and lied to the CCO about them.167 The SEC found
Johns guilty, inter alia, of violating the Rule, barred him from working
in the securities field for five years before being able to apply for reentry and fined him about $350,000 for disgorgement, interest, and penalties.168 The compliance industry was encouraged that this case would
make it easier for CCOs to do their jobs.169
B.

Support for CCOs: Requiring CCO to Have Professional Knowledge

In 2011 the SEC created its Compliance Program Initiative to oversee financial firms that had been warned about compliance deficiencies
but did not correct them.170 In Modern Portfolio Management, Inc.
(“MPM”)171 the SEC conducted an examination of MPM and found
violations of the IAA including making misleading statements in its
marketing materials, failing to implement written policies and procedures to prevent violations of the IAA, and failing to perform annual
compliance reviews.172 When MPM did not remedy these violations
over a period of years, the SEC brought an action against the company
and its principals.173 The SEC noted that MPM had designated as CCO
an employee without relevant compliance knowledge, experience, or
training.174 When the CCO left, one of the principals took over as
165. In re Carl D. Johns, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 3655, Investment Company Act Release No. 30675, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-15440, 2013 WL
4521169 (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ia-3655.pdf; Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Sanctions Colorado-Based Portfolio Manager
for Forging Documents and Misleading Chief Compliance Officer (Aug. 27, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539791420#
.Uv0JQvshMuc; ICA, Rule 38a-(1), supra note 58.
166. In re Carl D. Johns, supra note 165, at 2.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Samuel Rubenfeld, SEC Stands Up for Compliance Officers in Colorado Case, WALL
ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Aug. 29, 2013, 3:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/08/29/sec-stands-up-for-compliance-officers-in-colorado-case/.
170. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Sanctions Three Firms Under
Compliance Program Initiative (Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540008287#.Uv5aWfshMuc.
171. In re Modern Portfolio Management, Inc., Investment Adviser Act Release No.
3702, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-15583, 2013 WL 5741332 (Oct. 23, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/ia-3702.pdf.
172. Id. at 2, 5–6.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 3.
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CCO although he too had no compliance experience.175 The SEC, in
addition to fining MPM and its principals and censuring the principals,
required MPM to hire a compliance consultant for three years and to
designate someone in the company, other than either of the principals,
to be the CCO.176 This case should be encouraging to CCOs because it
indicates that merely paying lip service to compliance requirements will
not satisfy SEC investigators. A knowledgeable CCO is almost a requirement to indicate a meaningful compliance program that satisfies SEC
rules.
C.

Liability of CCOs: Failure to Supervise

It is, however, the cases in which CCOs have been charged with
malfeasance that create the greatest interest and concern for the industry. Of these, the issues of when a CCO is a supervisor and whether the
CCO carried out supervisory responsibilities reasonably have been the
most contentious issues for more than twenty years.177 Because the
cases are so fact specific, it is difficult for CCOs to determine clear
guidelines for getting company employees to act within regulatory and
ethics code rules without becoming their supervisors so that CCO liability does not hinge on the reasonableness of CCO behavior, a standard
that is even less clear.178 In a good example of the confusion on these
issues, SEC commissioners have determined that a CCO discharged
supervisory responsibilities in a reasonable manner without ever determining that the CCO was a supervisor.179
1.

Gutfreund and Urban

Recently, the most notable case was the proceeding the SEC
brought against Theodore W. Urban which the SEC ultimately dismissed in 2012.180 In spite of the eventual dismissal, it is a very frightening case for CCOs. Urban, who had been head of the Legal and
Compliance Department at a financial firm, lost his professional reputation and employment opportunities and incurred significant expense
because of this proceeding.181 In the case against Urban, the SEC and
its expert witness relied heavily on the leading case, In re John H.
Gutfreund.182
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 7–8.
177. See, e.g., Richard Y. Roberts, Remarks at Securities Law Comm’n of Fed. Bar
Ass’n, Failure to Supervise Liability for Legal and Compliance Personnel (Dec. 7, 1992).
178. Id. at 6.
179. Id. at 8–10 (discussing Arthur James Huff, No. 34-29017 (Mar. 28, 1991)).
180. In re Theodore W. Urban, Order Dismissing Proceeding, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 66259, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 3366, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-13655, 2012 WL 261254 (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sec
.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-66259.pdf.
181. In re Theodore W. Urban, Initial Decision, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 402, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-13655, 2010 WL 3500928 1, 57 (ALJ
Sept. 8, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/2010/id402bpm.pdf.
182. In re John H. Gutfreund, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34–31554,
Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-7930, 1992 WL 362753 (Dec. 3, 1992), available
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Both the Gutfreund and the Urban cases were about CCOs’ failure
to supervise subordinates who committed illegal acts.183 What was so
distressing about the Urban case was that the SEC applied the law from
Gutfreund when the facts of the two cases were significantly different. In
Gutfreund, the Chairman and CEO of Salomon Brothers as well as the
President and Vice Chairman were informed by the CLO, who supervised both the Legal and Compliance Departments, that a subordinate
had violated federal securities laws, but none of them took any
action.184 For almost two years, the subordinate continued to make
false bids for U.S. Treasury securities on behalf of Salomon.185 The
SEC found the CEO, the President, and the Vice Chairman guilty of
violating section 15(b)(4)(E) of the SEA for failing to reasonably supervise their subordinate who they knew was violating federal securities
law.186 Then the SEC discussed the role of the CLO.187
The SEC concluded that the CLO was not a direct supervisor of the
subordinate committing the illegal acts at the time he first learned of
them, so the SEC did not charge him in this proceeding; however, the
SEC took the opportunity to explain when a legal advisor becomes a
supervisor for purposes of the SEA.188 The SEC noted that the CLO
did notify senior management about the illegal acts and urged them to
report to the government, but he did not take any other actions to prevent and detect future violations.189 The SEC said that CLOs or CCOs
do not become supervisors merely based on their job titles; being a
supervisor depends on having the “requisite degree of responsibility,
ability or authority to affect the conduct of the employee whose behavior is at issue.”190 Someone in the position of the CLO at Salomon
cannot be “a mere bystander,” but must take “affirmative steps . . . to
address the misconduct.”191 If management still fails to act, then one
in that position must take “additional steps . . . [which] may include
disclosure of the matter to the entity’s board of directors, resignation
from the firm, or disclosure to regulatory authorities.”192 That is the
language that the SEC relied on in proceeding against Theodore
Urban.193
Urban headed the compliance, human resources, and internal
audit departments at FBW, a financial firm.194 The problem he faced
at http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/sloan-school-of-management/15-649-the-law-of-mergersand-acquisitions-spring-2003/study-materials/class13gutfreund.pdf.
183. Id. § IV(A)(4).
184. Id.
185. Id. § IV(A)(13).
186. Id. §§ IV(B)(1) & (2).
187. Id. § IV(C).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In re Theodore W. Urban, Initial Decision, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 402, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-13655, 2010 WL 3500928 1, 46–47 (ALJ
Sept. 8, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/2010/id402bpm.pdf.
194. Id. at 2.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE105.txt

2015]

unknown

COMPLIANCE OFFICERS

Seq: 23

20-APR-15

9:28

191

was a company broker who falsified accounts and made unsuitable
trades for accounts which had very high turnover and commission-toequity ratios.195 Urban recommended the broker’s termination, but
the broker’s direct supervisor, board member, and “most powerful person at the firm” vehemently objected.196 The broker was prosecuted,
convicted, and served a year in prison.197 The SEC’s expert testified
that in his opinion Urban was the broker’s supervisor and had supervisory responsibility because of the senior level position he held and his
knowledge of the broker’s activities.198 According to the expert, “a person who gets involved in a compliance problem becomes a supervisor”
as set out in Gutfreund.199 The SEC asserted that CCOs are supervisors
if they play a “significant, even if shared, role in the firm’s supervisory
structure [even if their] authority [is] subject to countermand at a
higher level.”200 The SEC’s position was that Urban didn’t respond
“vigorously” enough when he discovered the broker’s illegal
activities.201
The Chief Administrative Law Judge (“CALJ”) hearing the case was
convinced that Urban was honest and tried to do the right thing.202
She distinguished the facts in Gutfreund from those in Urban’s case:
Gutfreund involved known criminal conduct whereas in Urban’s case the
guilty broker was well-respected and his conduct was only suspect to a
few people; the CLO in Gutfreund acted as a bystander whereas Urban
“took actions, and . . . shared information;” Urban’s senior managers
lied to him, kept information from him, and told him they were carrying out their responsibilities vis-a-vis the broker, although they were
not.203 The CALJ agreed with the SEC that under a strict interpretation of Gutfreund, Urban was the broker’s supervisor because he along
with many others at FBW had “a requisite degree of responsibility, ability, or authority to affect [the broker’s] conduct.”204 Nevertheless, she
concluded that Urban did not fail to supervise the broker under SEA
section 15(b)(4)(E)(i) because he acted “reasonably” in carrying out
his responsibilities.205 The SEC appealed the ruling: three SEC commissioners recused themselves, the remaining two were split, and therefore, the SEC dismissed the case.206
195. Id. at 8–9.
196. Id. at 3, 25–26.
197. Id. at 39.
198. Id. at 40.
199. Id. at 40, 42.
200. Id. at 46.
201. Id. at 47.
202. Id. at 48.
203. Id. at 49–50.
204. Id. at 51–52.
205. Id. at 55–56.
206. In re Theodore W. Urban, Order Dismissing Proceeding, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 66259, Investment Adviser Act Release No. 3366, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-13655, 2012 WL 261254 (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www.sec
.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-66259.pdf. When there isn’t agreement among a majority of commissioners on the merits of a case, the initial decision is void. Commission Rule
of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (2006).
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Theories for Supervisory Liability

The prominence of this case and the lack of a decision on its merits has caused a great deal of uncertainty and discomfort among compliance professionals.207 Of course the negligence standard of reasonable
behavior works well enough across wide swaths of the law, but in the
context of assessing the behavior of CCOs, it may not accomplish the
purpose of the SEA. It is desirable for CCOs to act forcefully in encouraging their firms and its employees to obey the law and behave ethically, but the looming liability for supervising others might discourage
CCOs from taking the most vigorous actions to accomplish that goal for
fear of appearing to be a supervisor and then being liable under a very
subjective reasonableness standard.208 In the midst of trying to eliminate illegal behavior without the benefit of hindsight, it can be difficult
to determine when reasonably carrying out a CCO’s responsibilities
does not veer into the territory of being a supervisor.
One of Urban’s expert witnesses suggested that instead of using a
negligence standard for determining CCO liability under the SEA, a
supervisor should be defined as “a person who knows, or reasonably
should know, that he or she has been given the authority and responsibility for exercising control over one or more activities” of another person.209 The CALJ rejected this suggestion,210 but it is worthy of
consideration to provide clarity, particularly if “control” means the ability to sanction.211 Some SEC commissioners have asserted that control
is not necessary at all for supervisory liability: the responsibility or
authority merely “to affect the conduct” of another employee is sufficient for supervisory liability.212
Late last year, the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets (“DTM”)
issued responses to questions about CCO liability.213 The DTM suggested that a question one might ask to determine whether a CCO is a
supervisor is whether “the person ha[d] the power to affect another’s
207. See, e.g., Schoeff, supra note 2.
208. Deborah A. DeMott, The Crucial but (Potentially) Precarious Position of the Chief
Compliance Officer, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 56, 77 (2013).
209. In re Theodore W. Urban, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 402, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-13655, 2010 WL 3500928 1, 42 (ALJ Sept. 8, 2010), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/2010/id402bpm.pdf.). About twenty years
earlier former SEC Commissioners Lochner and Schapiro offered a similar definition: a
“supervisor” has been given the authority and responsibility for exercising control over
one or more activities of another person so that the “supervisor” “could take effective
action to prevent a violation of [SEC] rules.” In re Arthur James Huff, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 34–29017, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-6700, 1991
WL 296561 (Mar. 28, 1991) (concurring opinion).
210. In re Theodore W. Urban, 2010 WL 3500928, at 42 n.75.
211. Roberts, supra note 177, at 11 (noting Lochner/Schapiro formula that person’s power to control, i.e., ability to sanction, determines existence of supervisory
relationship).
212. Id. at 18.
213. Frequently Asked Questions about Liability of Compliance and Legal Personnel at Broker-Dealers under Sections 15(b)(4) and 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, SEC
DIV. OF TRADING AND MARKETS (Sept. 30, 2013), available at www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/faq-cco-supervision-093013.htm.
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conduct,” and the examples given were whether the person “ha[d] the
ability to hire, reward or punish.”214 The DTM said another determining question is whether the CCO had the authority to stop the violations even if the CCO did not “have the power to fire, demote or reduce
. . . pay.”215 These definitions and explanations only add to the ambiguity of the CCO’s position and could discourage meaningful discourse
between CCOs and other employees.
A change in the definition of “supervisor” that would make CCOs
better protected and feel more secure in carrying out their responsibilities, is defining “supervisor” in the context of securities law as the U. S.
Supreme Court recently defined “supervisor” for the purpose of vicarious liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.216 In Vance
v. Ball State University,217 the Court had to decide whether a fellow
employee who was being accused of creating a racially hostile work environment was a supervisor or merely a co-worker.218 Under Title VII the
liability of the employer depends on the status of the employee/harasser.219 The Court heard this case to settle a conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.220 The Second and Fourth Circuits held that a
supervisor had “the ability to exercise significant direction over
another’s daily work.”221 The First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits held
that to be a supervisor one must have “the power to hire, fire, demote,
promote, transfer, or discipline.”222 Justice Alito, writing for the majority, held that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s
unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that
employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e.,
to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.”223
Justice Alito noted the wide variety of definitions of the term
“supervisor” both in general usage and in legal contexts.224 He called
the Second and Fourth Circuits’ definition “nebulous,”225 “murky,”226
and a “study in ambiguity,”227 whereas the definition he upheld “can be
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443 (2013).
217. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
218. Id. at 2439.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2443.
221. Id. (citing Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2003);
Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245–47 (4th Cir. 2010)).
222. Id. (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 470 (7th Cir. 2011); Noviello
v. Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 96 (1st Cir. 2005); Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F.3d
1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004)).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2444–45.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 2449.
227. Id.
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readily applied.”228 The four dissenting justices noted that the Court
“adopted a standard, rather than a clear rule . . . [because] no crisp
definition of supervisor could supply the unwavering line the Court
desires.”229
A definition of “supervisor” has been problematic in other situations as well. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) defines a
“supervisor” as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly
direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment.230

Cases have been litigated that turned on applying that definition to
determine whether certain employees were supervisors or not.231 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has said that “[t]here are no
bright lines controlling the determination of whether a particular position comes within the definition of ‘supervisor’ under the NLRA.”232
So, the NLRA definition would not be helpful in the CCO situation; it
would maintain the ambiguity. It is likely that part of a CCO’s job
would be to “direct” employees or to “effectively recommend” actions
regarding them. It would not be useful to have those actions result in
CCO liability if employees then violated the law in spite of the CCO’s
best efforts to implement appropriate compliance procedures and to
report violations.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has noted that the
Clean Air Act uses the term “supervisor” but does not define the degree
of authority necessary to be a supervisor.233 The court said it has held
that the governing criterion for defining “supervisor” under the Clean
Air Act is “ ‘substantial control’ ”234 which does not mean “ultimate,
maximal, or preeminent control,” but does mean “having the ability to
direct the manner in which work is performed and the authority to correct problems.”235 That definition could also sweep an active CCO into
its liability sphere.
Although the reasons for preferring one definition or another for
the term “supervisor” are different in the Title VII, the labor law, the
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2463 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2013).
231. See, e.g., Kaczynski v. Draper Printing, 848 F. Supp. 1060, 1062–63 (D. Mass.
1994) (determining whether employee was supervisor as defined by NLRA and, therefore,
not part of union bargaining unit); In re Employees of Bermudian Springs School District,
69 Pa. D. & C.2d 765 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1975) (construing “supervisor” as defined in the Pa.
Public Employee Relations Act which is same definition as in NLRA).
232. AFTRA v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 745 F.2d 392, 399 (6th Cir. 1984).
233. United States v. Pearson, 274 F.3d 1225, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2001).
234. Id. (citing United States v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1993)).
235. Id.
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environmental law, and the securities law contexts, acknowledging the
ambiguities in the term and the different possibilities for defining it are
important in arriving at the best definition in the context of holding
CCOs in any industry liable for the actions of others. In the latter situation, the goal is to have CCOs be experienced enough to assess company compliance risk properly; diligent enough to provide policies and
procedures to ensure company compliance, supported enough in
words and deeds by line supervisors, top managers, and directors to
achieve company-wide compliance, and confident enough that doing
their job appropriately will not be construed as acting as a supervisor,
subjecting them to liability for the misdeeds of others.236 There is no
useful reason to use an expansive definition of “supervisor” in the context of CCO liability. It would reward inaction. The SEC should adopt
Justice Alito’s definition of “supervisor” in Vance for CCOs, setting an
example for other regulatory agencies.
3.

An Unfortunate Example of Supervisory Liability

In Manuel Lopez-Tarre,237 Lopez-Tarre, CCO for FTC Capital Markets, Inc., was responsible for supervising the customer account activity
of the owner of the company.238 Tasks included in his area of responsibility were reviewing correspondence, including electronic correspondence, of the owner, Clamens, and another employee, Lopez.239 The
SEC issued a judgment against Clamens and Lopez for violating securities fraud laws when they made tens of millions of dollars of unauthorized trades in their customer Citgo’s account.240 The SEC also
charged Lopez-Tarre with failing to reasonably supervise Clamens and
Lopez by reviewing their correspondence and, therefore, failing to prevent and detect their violations.241 He agreed to being barred from
associating with financial organizations in a supervisory capacity for one
year.242
It is clear that Lopez-Tarre did not do his job so he should have
been charged with failing to implement compliance procedures or with
aiding and abetting securities law violations. His failure to carry out his
primary responsibilities allowed the violations to persist. He did not
236. This discussion of supervisory liability does not apply to CCOs’ being supervisors of personnel in their own compliance departments where their supervisory responsibilities are clear and the same as managers of any other department. See, e.g., In re Dennis
S. Kaminski, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65347, Administrative Proceeding
Release No. 3-14054, 2011 WL 4336702 (Sept. 16, 2011) (finding Kaminski as CCO of
MSC ran understaffed, poorly paid, inadequately supervised department, failed to communicate with senior management and, therefore, was suspended for eighteen months
and fined $50,000).
237. In re Manuel Lopez-Tarre, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65391, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-14562, 2011 WL 4431616 (Sept. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/34-65391.pdf.
238. Id. at 4.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 3.
241. Id. at 6.
242. Id.
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have the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline
Clamens or Lopez, so using his failure as a supervisor to justify sanctions
against him was not necessary to satisfactorily resolve this case, and calling his wrongdoing supervisory failure just contributes to wariness
among CCOs in pursuing their responsibilities.
D.

Liability of CCOs: Failing to Implement and
Review Compliance Procedures

Responsibilities of CCOs that are not controversial, but have led to
cases brought against them by the SEC, require registered investment
advisors to implement and regularly review “written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the [IAA] and its
rules” and to maintain, enforce, and distribute a written code of ethics.243 The importance of these cases is to suggest that all regulated
companies, no matter how small, must consider compliance a fundamental part of their business operations and invest the resources necessary to maintain a functioning compliance program.244 It is not
sufficient to merely designate someone as CCO and purchase an offthe-shelf compliance manual.245 If that CCO does not do the implementation and review the job specifically and adequately, he or she is
going to be responsible for the failure. The case of Asset Advisors246 is
instructive.
Carl Gill founded Asset Advisors (“AA”) and registered with the
SEC as an investment adviser.247 AA had $27 million in assets under
management, six employees only one of whom (Gill) provided investment advice to clients.248 Although Gill had no experience or training
in compliance, he served as CCO because there was no one else to do
it.249 It was during an SEC routine on-site exam that Gill learned about
requirements for a written compliance program and a written code of
ethics.250 AA then adopted a code of ethics and created a compliance
243. IAA §§ 206(4)-7, 204A-1 (2012).
244. See, e.g., In re Feltl & Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65838,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3325, Investment Company Act Release No. 29875,
Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-14645, 2011 WL 5911238 (Nov. 28, 2011)
(dually-registered broker-dealer and investment advisor failed to adopt and implement
written compliance policies and procedures and code of ethics that specifically applied to
its advisor business resulting in failures to get required client consent, to disclose fees, to
charge proper commissions).
245. See, e.g., In re OMNI Investment Advisors, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 65837, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3323, Investment Company Act Release
No. 29873, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-14643, 2011 WL 5970787 (Nov. 28,
2011) (registered investment advisor listed owner as CCO although he was in Brazil on
three-year religious mission and had no compliance program other than compliance
manual not specifically tailored to OMNI’s business).
246. In re Asset Advisors, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release 3324, Investment
Company Act Release No. 29874, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-14644, 2011
WL 5970790 (Nov. 28, 2011).
247. Id. at 2.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 3–4.
250. Id. at 3.
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manual but did nothing to make those documents particularly relevant
to the business at hand or to implement relevant procedures.251 After
four years of non-compliance, Gill in an agreement with the SEC,
undertook to withdraw AA’s registration as an investment advisor, close
operations and dissolve itself in addition to paying a penalty of
$20,000.252
The Banking Secrecy Act (“BSA”)253 also mandates financial institutions, including small check cashing businesses, to designate a compliance officer who must develop policies, procedures, and controls to
guard against money laundering.254 In addition, the compliance
officer must regularly file currency transaction reports with the Department of Treasury.255 Last year, the compliance officer for a Los Angeles check cashing store pleaded guilty to DOJ charges for failing to have
an effective anti-money laundering program.256 He failed to create the
required records, verify customer identification, and file currency transaction reports.257 He was sentenced to eight months in prison.258
E.

Liability of CCOs: Aiding and Abetting Securities Law Violations

Similarly, if CCOs establish compliance policies and procedures
that are not reasonably designed to address the actual existing risks at
their companies, or they establish appropriate compliance policies and
procedures but fail to implement them, they will be liable for aiding,
abetting, and causing their companies’ violations. In Buckingham
Research Group, Inc.,259 for example, Lloyd Karp was the CCO for Buckingham Research Group, Inc. (“BRG”), an equity research firm servicing hedge funds and other institutional customers.260 Buckingham
Capital Management, Inc. (“BCM”) had a subsidiary registered investment adviser located in adjoining office space with little physical separation; thus, there was a significant risk of information flow between the
two entities resulting in the potential misuse of BRG’s research information by BCM.261 BRG created written policies and procedures to detect
and prevent misuse, but in practice did not follow them.262 Karp, as
the CCO, was responsible for establishing and administering all com251. Id. at 3–5.
252. Id. at 5–6.
253. 31 U.S.C. § 5301 (2013).
254. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2014).
255. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2014).
256. Press Release, DOJ, Los Angeles Check Cashing Store, Its Head Manager and
Compliance Officer Sentenced for Violating Anti-Money Laundering Laws, 2013 WL
142511 (Jan. 14, 2013).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. In re Buckingham Research Group, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
63323, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3109, Administrative Proceeding Release No.
3-14125, WL 4648468 (Nov. 17, 2010).
260. Id. at 2.
261. Id. at 3.
262. Id. at 3–4, 6.
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pany compliance policies.263 When he did not act to address the risk of
misuse of material, nonpublic information, the SEC found that he “willfully aided and abetted and caused the firms’ violations.”264 The SEC
censured him and fined him $35,000.265
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

As CCOs become more involved in general business activities, they
become more threatened by the risk of supervisory accountability for
the regulatory violations of company employees to whom they have provided advice.266 Unfortunately, that threat can limit the effectiveness of
a company’s compliance and ethics program and its CCO.267 Regulatory agencies are beginning to recognize this problem they themselves
encouraged when they first started requiring comprehensive compliance programs. In a report last year, SIFMA specifically told top executives that they “should not assign supervisory or managerial
responsibilities to Compliance . . . even in limited ways or on a temporary basis.”268 Now it is time for these agencies to define “supervisor” so
that there is no ambiguity in its meaning for CCOs.
A functional difficulty for CCOs lies in straddling the line between
being team players for their companies and being quasi-employees of
regulating agencies.269 In the best interests of the company from both
regulatory and reputational viewpoints, the board and other C-suite
managers should view the CCO as an equal C-suite businessperson who
contributes to the company’s well-being by monitoring and limiting
risk, rather than as a thorn in its side. The position should be dedicated to managing the company’s compliance and ethics responsibilities through investigation, monitoring, education, and prescription, but
not through control of employees. If CCOs are supported in word and
deed by top management and directors, then their advice will be sufficient to encourage all company employees to follow the law and company ethics rules, and they will not need supervisory powers to get their
jobs done.

263. Id. at 6.
264. Id. See also In re Ronald S. Rollins, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 70058,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3635, Investment Company Act Release No. 30633,
Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-15392, 2013 WL 3874860 (July 29, 2013) (aiding
and abetting fraud of another); In re Wunderlich Securities, Inc., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 64558, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3211, Administrative Proceeding
Release No. 3-14403, 2011, WL 2098195 (May 27, 2011) (aiding and abetting failure to
adopt and implement written policies and procedures and written code of ethics).
265. Id. at 10–11.
266. SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS’N, supra note 137, at 5.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 29.
269. Mary Jo White, SEC Chair, Remarks at National Society of Compliance Professionals National Membership Meeting, Oct. 22, 2013 (noting that “at the SEC, we rely on
you” and “we see you as a critical line of defense against violations of the securities laws
and regulations . . . .”).

